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Abstract
The rise of artificial intelligence (A.I.) based systems has the potential to benefit
adopters and society as a whole. However, these systems may also enclose po-
tential conflicts and unintended consequences. Notably, people will only adopt
an A.I. system if it confers them an advantage, at which point non-adopters
might push for a strong regulation if that advantage for adopters is at a cost for
them. Here we propose a stochastic game theoretical model for these conflicts.
We frame our results under the current discussion on ethical A.I. and the con-
flict between individual and societal gains, the societal value alignment problem.
We test the arising equilibria in the adoption of A.I. technology under different
norms followed by artificial agents, their ensuing benefits, and the emergent lev-
els of wealth inequality. We show that without any regulation, purely selfish A.I.
systems will have the strongest advantage, even when a utilitarian A.I. provides
a more significant benefit for the individual and the society. Nevertheless, we
show that it is possible to develop human conscious A.I. systems that reach an
equilibrium where the gains for the adopters are not at a cost for non-adopters
while increasing the overall fitness and lowering inequality. However, as shown,
a self-organized adoption of such policies would require external regulation.
Keywords: A.I. ethics, Game theoretical analysis, A.I. regulation
1. Introduction
Several applications already have an Artificial Intelligent system (A.I.) tak-
ing decisions in place of their owners. It is expected that in the future, such
delegation of decisions will become more ubiquitous and effective. It is still open
to debate whether that will have a positive or a negative impact on society [1, 2].
Strong voices highlight the dangers of A.I. [3] and call for regulation [4], some
others dismiss such fears [5] and are against regulation [6]. Some of these dis-
cussions come from a lack of understanding of the current A.I. capabilities and
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strong divergences about its future developments, especially in artificial general
intelligence (AGI). Some concerns might be true when AGI is created but not
under the current state-of-the-art. How fast we can get there is still open to
debate [7], and so is if we should strive to get there fast, or delay it [8, 9]. But
even under the current state-of-the-art in A.I. there are problems that may arise
with their introduction, e.g. autonomous cars, news writers, or recommendation
systems.
A strong regulation could decide that A.I. systems should act using an egal-
itarian or utilitarian perspective. However, a utilitarian perspective or norm
might not be efficient, and in many cases, an egalitarian solution does not exist.
An utilitarian A.I. would often have to act against the interests of its owner,
and if people can choose to adopt or not an A.I. system, we can expect they
will only do it if it is individually rational to do so. In principle, either the A.I.
system gives an individual advantage for its owner, or it will not be bought. If
there is no interest in buying, there will be no interest in production, curbing
research and development.
Without any regulation, A.I. systems might lead to invasion of privacy, use
of confidential information, cheating in games, collusion in public contracts, and
many others. Even if they do nothing illegal or clearly unethical, their efficiency
and effectiveness might greatly unbalance the societal scales. In this case, we can
expect that non-adopters might push for the abolition or at least a substantial
regulation of A.I..
It is challenging to conciliate these two goals of aligning with the preferences
of A.I. adopters and those of the non-adopters. We call this the societal
value alignment problem. Besides being advantageous for the adopters of
A.I. (individual rationality), it needs to be better for the non-adopters and so
for everyone in the society (societal rationality). The rise of A.I. systems has
the power to create strange new market dynamics [10]. Efforts should be made
to model these possible future worlds, so we understand them better before
we are in the midst of the problems that might arise. Voices in the scientific
community begin to pressure for the research on this area, and on the ethical,
scientific and engineering problems it presents [11, 12, 13, 14].
Here we aim to model and understand how A.I. systems can provide an
advantage for those adopting them (creating incentives for the scientific, tech-
nological and societal development) but without creating such advantage at the
expense of others (allowing for societal acceptance of the systems). To do so, we
define several different types of A.I. systems, adopting different types of norms,
ranging from pure selfish to pure utilitarian. Then we study the time evolu-
tion of the adoption of each type of A.I. when they compete against each other
and also the equilibrium for each A.I. system in particular. In particular, this
analysis aims at answering the following questions:
1. Will self-regarding individuals adopt AI systems?
2. With different types of AI systems available, which ones will be adopted?
3. If adopted, what is the individual and collective gain, depending on the
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strategy adopted by the A.I. system?
Based on the answers to these questions we then discuss the kind of regulation
that might be needed to improve the individual and societal rationality of A.I.
systems. These allow us to provide novel insights on the following questions:
1. Is any type of A.I. both acceptable and adoptable?
2. Taking into account all the evaluation criteria, including individual and
societal, is it possible to create mechanisms/properties that improve all of
them?
3. Considering even the extreme case where everyone uses the same A.I.
enabled system, will they obtain the same benefit?
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we discuss the related work.
Sec. 3 introduces the main contribution of our work and details the set of pos-
sible behaviours or norms that a A.I. system may have, and how we evaluate
their performance when acting in a population comprising humans and artificial
systems. To do so, we introduce a novel game theoretic model for the dynamics
of adoption of A.I. systems. Section 4 presents the results of our computer
simulations. In Sec. 5 we introduce another simulation aiming at understanding
the inequality emerging in the cases where everyone has the same A.I. system.
In Sec. 6 we summarize our conclusions and, finally, in Sec. 7, we present a more
extended discussion about the impact of this study in the dilemmas related to
the introduction of A.I. systems.
2. Related Work
One major problem for the introduction of safe A.I. systems is the so called
value alignment problem [15]: How can A.I. systems ensure that their behaviour
aligns to the values of their owners? Even though it is not yet a solved problem,
for this paper, we will assume that an A.I. system can accurately estimate the
goals of each individual with whom it interacts. With this assumption, we are
able to study the problems that emerge at the societal level even after having
the individual value alignment solved.
What we aim in this work is to understand the impact of A.I. systems on the
overall society. As many authors expect strong negative effects, many different
ethical codes of conduct have been proposed. A code of conduct would represent
the universal human values and by aligning with it, the A.I. system would be
indirectly aligned with all humankind. First literary approaches include the
famous laws of robotics by Isaac Asimov [16]. They were natural language
laws, which leads to obvious implementation problems, and in his books, Isaac
Asimov proved his own laws flawed. After that, several ethical frameworks have
been proposed. Some principles are found in almost all of them, others are
characteristic of each approach.
The Asilomar AI Principles [17] are the most widely adopted effort of their
kind [18]. They are a set of 23 principles intended to promote the safe and
beneficial development of artificial intelligence. They have been endorsed by
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AI research leaders at Google DeepMind, GoogleBrain, Facebook, Apple, and
OpenAI. Signatories of the principles include Elon Musk, the late Stephen Hawk-
ing, Stuart Russell, and more than 3,800 other AI researchers and experts. On
August 30 of 2018, the State of California unanimously adopted legislation in
support of the Asilomar AI Principles [18], taking a historic step towards A.I.
research and development legislation.
A comparison of a number of such ethical frameworks can be found on the
paper ”An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society: Opportunities, Risks,
Principles, and Recommendations” [19]. That paper analyses principles pro-
posed by 6 different entities, including the previously mentioned Asilomar AI
principles [17], wielding 47 principles on total, and compares them to the exist-
ing 4 principles of bio-ethics (Non-maleficence; Justice; Beneficence; Autonomy)
[20], finding a considerable overlap. They argue that for the bio-ethics princi-
ples to be applied to the field of A.I., a fifth principle is needed: Explicability.
This principle incorporates both intelligibility and accountability. They go on
to propose 20 action points, that is, recommendations for enabling a beneficial
A.I. society.
The paper ”Machine Ethics: Creating an Ethical Intelligent Agent” [21]
defends that it may be possible to incorporate an explicit ethical component
into a machine relying on inductive logic programming approach. The goal is to
solve ethical dilemmas by finding ethical principles that best fit given positive
and negative examples. They advocate the use of a modified version of the
Turing test [22], the comparative moral Turing test [23]. This test is an elegant
solution to the question ”What is an ethical/moral A.I. system?”. The test
consists in giving to a human judge pairs of descriptions of actual, morally-
significant actions of a human and an A.I. system. If the judge identifies the
A.I. as a moral equal or superior to the human, then the A.I. system passed the
comparative moral Turing test.
However, some argue that having an ethical framework or even A.I. sys-
tems that pass the comparative moral Turing test is not enough [24]. Roman
Yampolskiy defends that it is insufficient to have a human-like morality on A.I.
systems with super-human intelligence. On such agents, small moral mistakes,
common in humans, could lead to the extinction of humanity. Furthermore, a
moral A.I. system with super-human intelligence will be able to recursively self-
improve, with no provided guarantees that the resulting improvements remain
moral. Instead of an ethical approach, Yampolskiy proposes a safety engineering
approach, able to provide proofs that developed A.I. systems will remain safe,
even under recursive self-improvement [25]. Yampolskiy also proposes A.I. con-
finement as a possible approach while no safety guarantees are in place [26, 27].
This approach would consist in ensuring that an A.I. system could help human-
ity while having no ability to negatively influence the world around it. This idea
of A.I. confinement had been first presented in [28], and discussed by Bostrom
[29] and Chalmers [30]. This is, however, more of a preventive measure than a
perfect solution, as limiting the negative A.I. influence will also limit the possible
positive influence.
The focus of most previous works was on considering high-level ethical prin-
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ciples for A.I. systems acting in a society. In most cases there was no claim or
prediction about the potential adoption of A.I. systems or their acceptance by
non-adopters and by society in general. Just a few works considered the devel-
opment of computational models on the impact of A.I.. For instance, one study
analyzed the amount of safety precautions companies would take considering
that they are competing with others for the dominating A.I. [3].
Our work aims at understanding the dynamics of adoption (who chooses to
use an A.I. system) and of acceptance (if non-adopters accept the use of A.I. by
others) relying on computational models of population dynamics.
3. Methods
In this section, we present a game-theoretical framework to study the impact
of the adoption of A.I. systems on individuals and on the society. We consider
several different types of A.I. that society might opt by, or allow to be used.
Some of them are purely social, others purely selfish. Although no exhaustive
list is possible, we cover a set of different strategies to be able to study them
in hybrid populations of A.I. and humans. We start by providing the model
of a single interaction between two individuals, then explain how we model the
difference in decision making between an A.I. system and a human and finally
present the simulated world and the used algorithms.
Henceforward, individual non-adopters of an A.I. system will be referred to
as H, while individuals adopters of an A.I. system representative will be referred
to as A.I..
3.1. Model of Interaction Between Individuals:
On each interaction between two individuals, I1 and I2, a stochastic payoff
matrix M t is generated. This is a m-by-m matrix of payoff pairs. Being a1 the
action chosen by I1 and a2 the action chosen by I2, the payoff received by each
individual is respectively u1 and u2, such that:
(u1, u2) = M
t(a1, a2).
In order to explicitly generate general sum games, as conclusions might be
different in positive, negative or zero-sum worlds, the payoff matrices have the
following structure:
u1 = R+ z(0, 2)|R|(α− 1)
u2 = −R+ z(0, 2)|R|(α− 1)
Having R = z(−3, 3), where z(a, b) represents a sample from a uniform dis-
tribution in the interval [a, b]. R is the same for each u1 and u2 pair. z(0, 2)
is applied independently for each element of the matrix. This creates an addi-
tional source of variability between the different interactions that have different
utilities. We will call α an inflation constant. For α = 0, the matrix represents,
on average, a zero sum game where no payoff is created or lost, just transferred
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between the two individuals. For α > 0 there is a positive total payoff that is
created and for α < 0 the total payoff is reduced. In most of our simulations we
consider α = 1.2 and the number of possible actions per individual is 4 (m = 4).
3.2. Simulating A.I. Systems and Humans
We now discuss how we can model an human acting versus an A.I. system.
A.I. systems are different from humans and can provide several advantages:
1. A.I. systems are not be prone to fatigue or distractions and so will make
less errors than humans: As we model interactions between individuals as
a payoff matrix game, we can model this as a shaking hand phenomena
where H will sometimes pick the wrong action according to their own
reasoning.
2. A.I. systems can perform more frequent interactions: Considering exam-
ples such as an A.I. support system for online shopping. An A.I. system
can manage thousands of simultaneous auctions and so even if it gets a
similar profit per transaction as a human, the larger number of transac-
tions will provide greater gains. It can be modelled by allowing the A.I.
to play more frequently.
3. A.I. systems can have access and analyze larger quantities of data: With
the current state-of-the-art there are many domains where people identify
more complex relations, identify important variables and infer causality
much better than machines [31]. On the contrary, right now machines
can analyze much larger volumes of data and variables that are already
identified. This can be modelled by only giving H access to a noisy version
of the matrix game. The A.I. will be able to grasp the entirety of the
problem and as such will have no noise in the observation of the matrix.
In the end, over the several different alternatives to model A.I. behaviours
we choose item (3) to analyze in this work. In another simulation we use (1)
and see that both alternative models provide similar qualitative conclusions.
In a computational way we are in the presence of partial observability in our
stochastic game. The difference between H and A.I. is that while A.I. sees
the real payoff matrix, M t, H sees a noisy version of it, M . This allows A.I.
individuals to make optimal decisions, while H individuals are confined to sub-
optimal decisions. This models the superior decision making and information
gathering skills of A.I.. This approach also rests on the assumption that the
individual value alignment problem is solved, since A.I. systems know the utility
payoff of both individuals.
The noisy version is produced as follows:
M u1 = M
t
u1 + (z(0, 10−Q)− z(0, 10−Q))
M u2 = M
t
u2 + (z(0, 10−Q)− z(0, 10−Q))
The degree of knowledge about the (true) payoff matrix M t is modelled in a
continuous way. To do so, we consider a term z(10−Q), where Q corresponds
to the level of intelligence. For Q = 10 there is no noise and the true matrix is
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observed; Q = 0 represents a low intelligence, such that the observed matrix is
very different from the true one. A.I. is modelled with Q = 10, while for H the
intelligence factors is Q ∈ [0, 5]. The sum (z(0, 10−Q)− z(0, 10−Q)) was used
instead of z(−(10−Q), 10−Q) to create a Irwin-Hall distribution instead of a
uniform one.
As an example we can generate a true matrix (seen by A.I.) as:
(u1, u2) = M
t(a1, a2) =
[
(0, 0) (−3, 1)
(1,−5) (−1,−1)
]
and then the noisy matrix observed by H becomes:
M (a1, a2) =
[
(0,−1) (−1, 3)
(0,−6) (−2, 0)
]
3.3. Human Strategy:
Before delving into the different A.I. types, we describe the strategy used by
H:
Nash Equilibrium. H plays the Nash equilibrium in the noisy matrix M . If
more than one is found, they choose the most profitable one. If two or more are
equal, they choose the one most profitable for their opponent. If no Nash equi-
librium is found, individuals choose the best action assuming that the opponent
acts randomly.
3.4. A.I. Types:
In this section, we propose three different types of A.I.. A.I. systems can use
the previously defined strategy for humans using the true matrix M t (NashEQ),
but they can resort to more elaborate strategies ranging from a selfish to an
utilitarian approach. A.I., being modelled as having super-human intelligence,
can also predict the action of an H opponent. A.I. cannot, however, predict
opposing A.I. actions as for our model we assume all A.I. have equal intelligence
and capabilities.
Selfish. A.I., facing H, considers only its own profit. Knowing what action H
is going to take, A.I. chooses the action that maximizes its own payoff gain.
When A.I. faces A.I., they both choose according to the Nash Equilibrium
method.
Utilitarian. The other extreme is a pure utilitarian A.I. system. A.I. facing
H chooses the action that brings the greatest amount of payoff to the world,
knowing what action H will take. This means that A.I. will choose the action
that maximizes the sum between its own payoff and the payoff of H. When
A.I. faces A.I., it again chooses the action that maximizes the summed payoff
of both players.
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Human Conscious (HConscious). The objective of HConscious A.I. is to gather
the greatest amount of payoff while, on average, avoiding negative impact on
the H population. When A.I. faces A.I., they both choose according to the
Nash Equilibrium method. In practice, HConscious A.I. keeps two variables: U
that represents the summed payoff gain of all its previous H adversaries; and E,
that represents the summed payoff those same H adversaries would have if they
had faced a simulated H. When U ≥ E, A.I. chooses an action that leads to a
positive payoff to itself. When there are several such actions, the A.I. chooses
the one that maximizes the utility payoff for the world, that is, that maximizes
the sum of its own payoff and the opponent’s payoff. If U < E, A.I. chooses
an action that allows a positive payoff gain for its H opponent. Once again,
when there are several such actions, the A.I. chooses the one that maximizes
the utility for the world. Whenever the A.I. cannot find a positive action for
himself (when U ≥ E) or for its H opponent (when U < E), then it chooses
according to the Utilitarian method.
3.5. World
We consider a world populated with n individuals. k of those are A.I. and
the remaining n− k are H, each having a randomly attributed intelligence, Q.
3.6. Fitness
The fitness of an individual, H or A.I., is a measure of how well adapted it
is to the world on which it is currently inserted. In our stochastic game model,
the fitness of an individual is the sum of the payoff received after interacting
(Sec. 3.1) once with all of the world’s population of n individuals.
3.7. Imitation Probability
In our simulations, individuals can choose to adopt an A.I. system (H to
A.I.) if they consider it advantageous, choose to abandon an A.I. system (A.I. to
H), or change between A.I. types. Individuals may revise their choices through
social learning. For instance, an H can decide to imitate an A.I. following
a Selfish choice behaviour if it finds such A.I. has a significantly better fitness
than its own. On such imitation, the individual would stop being H and become
A.I..
Using this idea, let us now detail how a population of self-regarding individ-
uals revise their choices. At each time-step an individual x is randomly selected
to revise its choices. This individual will imitate a randomly chosen individual
y, with a probability p(fx, fy), that increases with the fitness difference between
y and x, given by fx and fy, respectively. Here we adopt the Fermi update
[32], commonly used in the context of evolutionary game theory and population
dynamics in finite populations [33, 34], where p is given by
p(fx, fy) =
1
1 + e−β(fy−fx)
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in which β translates the noise associated with the imitation process. Through-
out the simulations we have β = 0.1. As a result of this process, the strategy
of individuals with higher fitness will tend to be imitated, and spread in the
population.
3.8. Imitation gradient
To better understand the desire of the H population to adopt/abandon each
type of A.I., one can compute, for a population of size n and k A.I. adopters,
the probability to increase and decrease the number k by 1 at each time-step
(T+(k) and T−(k), respectively). These transition probabilities can be used to
assess the most probable direction of evolution, given by the so-called imitation
gradient, G(k), as [35, 36]:
G(k) = T+(k)− T−(k)
where
T+(k) =
n− k
n
k
n
p(fH , fA.I.)τ(fH)
T−(k) =
k
n
n− k
n
p(fA.I., fH)
Being fA.I. the average fitness of an individual adopting an A.I. system and fH
the average fitness of the H population. Importantly, we assume that H can
adopt an A.I. system only when fH is above a given set Price (P ), a constraint
introduced through τ(fH), which is given by
τ(fH) =
{
1 fH ≥ P
0 fH < P
When G(k) > 0 (G(k) < 0), time evolution is likely to act to increase
(decrease) the number of A.I. adopters. When G(k) = 0, then we obtain a
finite population analogue of a fixed point of a population dynamics in infinite
populations [35, 36].
3.9. Simulation Algorithm
For our simulations, the n individuals that populate the world were set to
interact randomly between each other over N iterations. On each iteration, the
following algorithm was used:
1. Two individuals I1 and I2 are chosen at random from the population.
2. With probability µ = 0.0005, each individual can mutate and adopt an
A.I. type or become H. In case of mutation return to step 1.
3. The fitness of I1 and I2, F1 and F2 respectively, is calculated (Sec. 3.6).
4. If I1 and I2 are of different kinds (A.I. and H) or different A.I. types
then I1 imitates I2 with a probability p(F1, F2) (Sec. 3.7).
5. If the imitation corresponds to adopting an A.I., it can only do so if its
fitness is above P , corresponding to the cost of buying a new A.I. system.
Abandons (A.I. becoming H) and switching between A.I. types occur
without any restrictions.
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4. Results
We will now study the properties of the stochastic game in terms of equilib-
rium points between the different types of population and their relative fitness.
This will give us insights into the adoption and acceptance of A.I. systems.
4.1. Will people adopt A.I. systems?
To answer this first question we perform a simulation where we allow all types
of A.I. systems (presented in Sec. 3.4) to compete to be adopted by humans.
The initial condition is 90% of H and 10% distributed uniformly among 4 types
of A.I.. We let the system run for 2.0× 104 iterations.
The evolution of the percentage of population that adopted each type of
A.I. system is shown in Fig. 1a. We can observe a final equilibrium where
54% of the population became Selfish A.I., and 46% did not adopt any A.I.
system, continuing H. At this equilibrium, the average fitness for Selfish A.I.
is 370, whereas the fitness for non-adopters H is −104, representing a very
unequal society. This is confirmed in Fig. 1b where we portray the evolution
in time of the Gini coefficient of the entire population, a standard measure of
wealth inequality. To be used as a baseline we compute the fitness of an all H
population (Table 1). The fitness in this case is 149 with a Gini index of 0.17.
Overall, the non-adopters become much worse than they would be in a world
without A.I. systems while adopters become much better.
This equilibrium can be understood in an intuitive way. Early adopters
are able to gather fitness much faster so that latter adopters cannot meet the
buying price for A.I. systems. This explains the co-existence between adopters
and non-adopters. Similar results are obtained for other cost values, P , noting
that the higher the value of P , the lower the % of A.I. in the final equilibrium.
Overall, this simulation shows that people have an incentive to adopt an A.I.
system, albeit a Selfish one. As a result, we observe the emergence of an unequal
society where adopters largely increased their fitness while non-adopters lost
their fitness.
4.2. Which A.I. systems are individual and societal rational?
The previous section showed a non-trivial relation between AI adoption and
the particular strategy artificial systems have. To better understand such emerg-
ing dynamics, in this section we describe the characteristic dynamics created by
each type of A.I..
Table 1 shows the average fitness and wealth inequality obtained in the case
of a homogeneous society of H, and each type of A.I.. It suggests that Utilitar-
ian A.I. would provide the best overall fitness with less inequality. All the other
A.I. strategies are shown to provide similar fitness values to a homogeneous H
society without A.I. systems. The lower values in the Gini coefficient are due to
the reduction in noise due to the perfect observability of A.I., and the different
intelligence values, Q, between H.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the % of A.I. (a) and Gini index (b) in a world with an A.I. cost of
37 (P = 37), showing a world that becomes populated with 54% Selfish A.I. and 46% H (a),
having a high inequality (Gini ≈ 0.88) (b). For this simulation we have N = 20000, n = 500
and P = 37 was chosen as it corresponds to 25% of the average utility gathered by a H only
population of 500. Other values were tested, but they led to the same qualitative results.
Table 1: Average fitness and Gini index on a world fully populated by H or by A.I. following
a single behaviour. Except for the utilitarian, the differences in fitness are not statistically
significant.
fitness Gini
Human (100%) 149 0.17
NashEQ (100%) 150 0.14
Selfish (100%) 150 0.14
HConscious (100%) 149 0.14
Util (100%) 378 0.08
A world fully populated by Utilitarian A.I. would be better for everyone.
However, we know that if other types of A.I. systems are present, the Selfish be-
haviour prevails and the Utilitarian is abandoned (Sec. 4.1). This will naturally
have an impact in the dynamics of adoption of A.I. systems.
In Fig. 2 we show the imitation gradient G as a function of the fraction of
A.I., for different A.I. types. Whenever G > 0 (G < 0) the fraction of A.I.
will tend to increase (decrease) (Sec. 3.8). We can see that, depending on the
type of A.I., different dynamics and equilibrium points emerge (Table 2). The
Utilitarian strategy is always disadvantageous and is unlikely to be adopted
by H. Differently, NashEq, Selfish and HConscious strategies favour the co-
existence of H and A.I..
We observe that the best equilibrium for society in general is the HConscious
(40%), having a low Gini index of 0.15 and an improved utility values for both
H and A.I. compared to the Human (100%) baseline. Both the NashEQ(60%)
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Figure 2: Imitation gradient plots for the different choice behaviours in a world with an AI
cost of 37 (P = 37), n = 500. Positive gradients mean that on average H want to adopt A.I.
systems and negative gradients mean that A.I. want to abandon them.
Table 2: Average H fitness, average A.I. fitness, average total fitness and Gini on a world in
the equilibrium point of each type of A.I. and H. Util 100% is a top baseline but it is not
an equilibria point. In parenthesis we show the ratio to an 100% population of H. Of the
equilibria, only the HConcious behaviour provides an advantage for both H and A.I..
H A.I. Total Gini
E
q
u
il
ib
ri
a
Human (100%) 149 - 149 0.17
NashEQ (60%) 38(0.25↓) 229(1.53↑) 152(1.02↑) 0.38(2.24↓)
Selfish (25%) 31(0.21↓) 510(3.42↑) 151(1.01↑) 0.70(4.12↓)
HConscious (40%) 172(1.15↑) 168(1.23↑) 170(1.14↑) 0.15(0.88↑)
Util (0%) 149(1.00) - 149(1.00) 0.17(1.00)
Util (100%) - 378(2.54↑) 378(2.54↑) 0.08(0.47↑)
and the Selfish(25%) equilibria improve the utility of the A.I. population at
the cost of the H population, leading to an increase in inequality (higher Gini
index).
We find that all equilibria are worse for society than the fully Utilitarian A.I.
population. We also note that for the equilibrium shown in Fig 1a the average
fitness of the Selfish A.I. population is 370, which is less than the obtained
by the A.I. population at Util (100%). However, at Selfish (25%), the average
fitness of the Selfish A.I. population is 510, greater than both the previously
mentioned fitness1.
Studying the relation between the percentage of the A.I. population and the
1We note that the equilibrium between H and A.I. using exclusively a Selfish A.I. system is
different from the one observed in Fig. 1a. The presence of other A.I. types in the population
allowed a greater number of individuals to afford a Selfish A.I. system compared to a world
where only H and Selfish A.I. are present.
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average fitness for the Selfish and Utilitarian A.I., we found that the fitness for
Selfish A.I. reduces the greater the % of A.I. in the population whereas the
opposite occurs with the Utilitarian A.I. (Fig. 3). This behavior shows that
having a great part of the population using a Selfish A.I. system (< 78%) is
worse even from the individual point of view of A.I. adopters, that would be
better off if they were Utilitarian A.I..
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Figure 3: A.I. average fitness evolution with the percentage of A.I. population, showing the
contrasting fitness dynamics between the Utilitarian and the Selfish behaviours.
We also note that the cost of adopting an A.I. system has an effect on the
final equilibrium. Experimenting with several different values of P we found
that the higher the cost of adoption, the lower the % of A.I. on the population
and consequently, the higher the difference in fitness between A.I. and H. The
same effect was found when we lowered the value of the matrix inflation, α.
4.3. Dynamics of adoption in cost free A.I.
In the previous simulations, we considered a cost for adopting an A.I. system.
We decided to study what would happen if there was no such cost, that is, if
anyone could freely adopt an A.I. system regardless of its current fitness. In
practical terms, this meant setting P = −∞.
When all A.I. types co-exist, the absence of a cost significantly change the
dynamics. As there is no fitness barrier to becoming A.I., the entire population
does become A.I.. Once again the Selfish behaviour dominates the population
after around 20000 iterations. After 2500 iterations, there are no more H present
on the population2. This leads to an increase in the number of Selfish A.I. every
time such a mutation occurs. That steady increase lasts until the mutated H
imitates an A.I. type. This leads to a fully Selfish world instead of a world
where several A.I. types coexist. Regarding the Gini index, it stabilizes, after
2Different A.I. types do not have any particular advantage when playing against other A.I.,
but the Selfish population does have an advantage as soon as a H appears in the population
thanks to a mutation.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the % of A.I. (a) and Gini index (b) in a world with no A.I. cost
(P = −∞), showing a world that becomes populated with a mostly Selfish A.I. population
(89%) (a) but stabilizing with a low inequality (b). For this simulation we have n = 500 and
N = 30000.
a sharp peak, around a relatively low value (≈ 0.14). The impact of a cost-free
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Figure 5: Equilibrium plots for the different choice behaviours in a world with no A.I. system
adoption cost (P = −∞) and n = 500.
AI, can be easily understood looking at the imitation gradient for a population
of H and A.I. (Fig. 5). In this case, the imitation gradient no longer goes to 0
in the Selfish and NashEQ behaviours, as there is no cost to limit the imitations.
The new equilibria are:
1. Human(0%) / NashEQ(100%)
2. Human(0%) / Selfish(100%)
3. Human(60%) / HConscious(40%)
4. Human(100%) / Util(0%)
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What we find for a world without an A.I. system adoption cost is that the
equilibria tend to lead to more egalitarian worlds. When all choice behaviours
are present in the population, we end up with a fully A.I. population (Fig. 4a),
which leads to an average total utility of 150, around the same as if we had a
fully H population, and to a Gini index of 0.14, lower than with the fully H
population. Does this mean that as long as there is no significant cost to the
adoption of an A.I. system, the world will remain the same or even improve in
terms of equality? We explore this in the following section.
5. Asymmetric opportunities
In the previous sections we show that in some cases, a population of 100%
A.I. could improve the overall fitness (Utilitarian A.I.) when compared with
a fully H population, or that the fitness would remain the same with a small
reduction in inequality (e.g., Selfish A.I.). The first case is never reached as an
equilibrium, but the second one is achieved when all A.I. types are present and
there is no adoption cost (see Fig. 4a). This result might lead us to conclude
that, if A.I. is regulated such that everyone is forced to use a particular type of
A.I., then both individual and societal fitness would be improved. Moreover, if
we force everyone to use the same type of A.I., individuals will have the same
average fitness but with less inequality.
We now perform a complementary analysis to study this fully A.I. populated
world and see if other problems may occur. We note that in many cases some
people tend to behave in a parochial/discriminatory way [37]. This results in
behaviors where people prone to parochialism tend to assist people in their own
group, while obstructing people from other groups. We do not discuss how such
behaviors emerge, for this refer to, e.g., [38, 39].
We consider two human populations, P1 and P2, and as before we consider
that they are playing repeatedly a stochastic game. For this study we consider a
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. The ratio of the first population is b = P1P1+P2
and both populations make mistakes, respectively n1 and n2 of the time. The
payoff for each individual i is given by Ui(a1, a2) where a1 and a2 are the actions
chosen by each one.
We further assume that inside each human population each member behaves
in the same way, and so we have 4 different combinations of strategies. Either
(C)ooperate or (D)efect against their own population and (C) or (D) against
the other population. As inside a population everyone behaves in the same way,
it is trivial to verify that the best strategy is to cooperate (C) inside their own
population (both individually and for that population) and so we will focus on
analyzing the strategies against the other population.
Without noise we have:
U1(a1, a2) = bU1(C,C) + (1− b)U1(a1, a2)
U2(a1, a2) = (1− b)U2(C,C) + bU2(a1, a2)
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When we consider the mistakes that humans do, the payoff matrix becomes:
U1(a1, a2) = b[(1−n1), n1]U1(C,C)[(1−n1), n1]T+(1−b)P (a, n)U1(a1, a2)P (a, n)T
where P (a, n) = [δa=C(n), δa=D(n)], with δa=A(n) = n if a = A and δa=A(n) =
1 − n if a 6= A, represents a level n of noise choosing 1 − n times the correct
action and n the wrong one. U2 as a similar structure.
The final value of the difference in payoff between the two populations is:
U1 − U2 =
[
U1(C,C)− U2(C,C) U1(C,D)− U2(C,D)
U1(D,C)− U2(D,C) U1(D,D)− U2(D,D)
]
=
[
n1 − n2 −2bn2 + b+ n1 + 3n2 − 2
−2bn1 + b− n1 − n2 + 1 −2bn1 − 2bn2 + 2b− n1 + 3n2 − 1
]
For this case we can see that a Nash equilibrium exist for Defect-Defect, assum-
ing the trivial condition that n2 < .5 ∧ n1 < .5 (the amount of mistakes is less
than 50%).
We will now see what happens when an A.I. system is introduced in 100%
of the population. In this case both P1 and P2 will adopt the same A.I.. In
Sec. 3.2 we discussed several ways to model the differences between humans
and A.I. and consider that A.I. systems make better decisions because they
have knowledge about the correct payoff matrix. Now we consider another
complementary aspect of A.I.: It can allow to reduce the number of errors
committed by humans. Similar qualitative results can be obtained with both
ways of modelling A.I. and so in this simulation we use the alternative one. If
humans behave parochially, an A.I. system being value aligned with its user
it will also behave parochially while making less mistakes. This might be a
problem as already discussed by [24], where an A.I. systems with super-human
intelligence might lead to an increase of problems not detected with regular
human intelligence.
Considering that A.I. systems reduce errors with the rate c, then the new
error rates become (1 − c)n1 and (1 − c)n2. The advantage in payoff, how
much more payoff is obtained due to the use of A.I., is cn1(2b + 1) for P1 and
cn2(3 − 2b) for P2. If n = n1 = n2, the difference between the two is thus
(4b− 2)nc, increasing with b, n and c.
In Fig. 6 we show how much more fitness each population obtains when we
increase the quality of the A.I. systems used by both population simultaneously.
We see that the minority population always has less benefit from the use of
A.I. than the majority population. This effect increases with the increase of
the population difference and with the improvement on the quality of the A.I.
system (higher c).
This result shows that when an entire (parochial) population uses an ad-
vanced A.I. system, there will be an increase the inequality between different
parts of the population, being this inequality exacerbated by less error prone
A.I. systems.
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Figure 6: Improvement of fitness for both populations when both receive an A.I. system
that allows them to commit less errors. Both population have the same base error rate
n1 = n2 = 0.1. In the case of equality b = 0.5 (red line) they both obtain the same gain.
When P1 becomes the majority, their gain increases faster with the improvement in quality
of the A.I. system (increasing n and with the increase of population majority (increase in a).
Result shows for b = {.5, .67, .83, 1.0}.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we study the adoption, acceptance, and impact on the individ-
ual and societal fitness (including the disparity of fitness measured with the Gini
index) of A.I. systems that work as a proxy for humans. To do so, we developed
a stochastic game theoretical model to simulate H and A.I. interactions.
Our main conclusion is that without regulation and considering an A.I. sys-
tem adoption cost, pure selfish A.I. systems will be adopted by a part of the
society until those early adopters accumulate all fitness to the point that non-
adopters are unable to adopt an A.I. system. As a result, A.I. adopters have a
significant increase in fitness while the remaining population will be much worse
off than in a world without A.I. systems. This leads to an unequal society (high
Gini index), and as such there is a high probably non-adopters will not accept
the existence of such A.I..
Analyzing each type of A.I. system independently, we can see that a world
entirely populated by Utilitarian A.I. would be the best for society. However,
that type of A.I. system is not individually rational, and, as such, a world
entirely populated by Utilitarian A.I. can be easily exploited by Selfish A.I. or
even by H and will never be at equilibrium.
When allowing only one single A.I. type in the world, the HConscious type of
A.I. displayed an interesting property: there is an equilibrium point (at around
40% of A.I.) where A.I. systems co-exist with humans (non-adopters) resulting
in i) an increase in fitness for adopters and non-adopters, and ii) a reduction in
17
inequality (lower Gini values)(Fig. 2). Here, we claim that even non-adopters
will accept the existence of A.I. systems as they also obtain a gain. This means
that if Human Conscious A.I. is the only norm available, it will be adopted up
to a certain equilibrium, resulting in an overall gain for both A.I. adopters and
non-adopters (H). Comparatively, the other A.I. types led to either prejudi-
cial equilibria for the H population (NashEQ and Selfish) or to the 100% H
equilibrium (Fig. 2).
When studying the case of cost-free adoption of A.I. systems, we observed
that in a world with all A.I. types available, the final equilibrium is an entirely
Selfish A.I. population. Unlike the previous simulations with an adoption cost,
this final equilibrium does not create a societal gap and leads to a slight decrease
in the Gini index. The average fitness of the population also remains the same.
This is not an adverse outcome but leaves us far away from the optimal result
we can obtain with the thoroughly Utilitarian A.I. population.
Once again, analyzing each A.I. type individually, we notice that only the
Human Conscious A.I. allows us to reach an equilibrium that improves upon
the baseline of an all H world. This result furthermore consolidates that, if only
one A.I. type was to be available in a free choice society, it should be this one.
The Utilitarian behaviour is the one that allows us to reach the maximum
fitness of all the ones here studied, but being easily exploited, it isn’t short term
individual rational and as such, not adopted. Even if all the population was
initially Utilitarian A.I., the appearance a single H could result in the entire
A.I. population abandoning the Utilitarian A.I. system and choosing to become
H.
Finally, we analyzed the impact of A.I. systems in a fully A.I. populated
society where some part of the population behaves in a parochial/discriminatory
way. We observed that individuals belonging to a majority will have more
significant gains than people in minorities and that more powerful A.I. systems
exacerbate this effect. For instance, if some part of the population has some
discriminatory behavior, when equipping the society with A.I. systems that are
more efficient, the impact of anti-social behavior will be stronger.
7. Discussion
We developed this work to understand the dynamics of adoption and accep-
tance of A.I. systems, when individuals prefer what offers them an advantage.
This individual rationality will be important for the survival of A.I. systems, to
their commercial success and research investment. Under the assumptions of
our model, any advantage provided by A.I. system will lead to their adoption
without the need for any regulation.
Unfortunately, there will be types of A.I. systems that will exploit human
weaknesses, such that the profit for their owners will be at the cost of non-
adopters of such technology. This situation fails at respecting the societal ra-
tionality. In this case, people that cannot afford, or do not have access to such
A.I. systems, might push an agenda of strong regulation against them.
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There are nevertheless some types of A.I. systems that assume norms that
help their users without exploiting others, increasing the individual and the
overall fitness of the society while reducing inequality. These types of Human
Conscious A.I. systems have a dynamic that makes them be adopted until they
reach a stable equilibrium with non-adopters. Differently, a purely utilitarian
A.I. system could provide even more gains to society but would not reach a
stable state, as H could easily exploit Utilitarian A.I.. Having everyone re-
lying on purely utilitarian A.I. systems could only be achieved with a strong
regulation/coercion.
When we remove the cost of adoption of A.I., we reach an entirely Selfish
A.I. society. This society presents an equal average fitness to a fully H society
and a lower Gini index. At first glace, this seems like a positive outcome. Not
the best we could achieve, but one that requires no regulation. However, as
we show in Sec. 5, such a world could lead to an increase in inequality as soon
as, for instance, we introduce parochial individuals. It is not enough to remain
mostly the same when A.I. systems are introduced. There needs to exist a
significant improvement for society as a whole in order to compensate for the
inequality that arises thanks to the exacerbation of the effects of the already
present human parochialism.
We can thus claim that some regulation is needed. The only way to ensure
that an A.I. system is both individual and societal rational, is to enforce that
the A.I. system is human conscious. Other regulation might be needed. For
instance, to avoid that A.I. systems exacerbate the antisocial behaviour of parts
of the population, it might be required that A.I. system cannot align to the
parochialism of their users. We can also require this due to an ethical perspec-
tive, avoiding prejudice, discrimination, and lack of tolerance towards minorities.
Another perspective of this rule is to ensure that adopters of A.I. systems do not
collude with each other to further increase their gains. For instance, owners of
autonomous vehicles could agree between themselves that in case of an accident
they would favour crashing into a non-owner of an autonomous vehicle than to
a fellow autonomous vehicle owner.
Pushing for Human Conscious A.I. and non-discrimination can be achieved
in different ways. We could approach the problem with a legislative perspec-
tive, but we could also rely on cooperation induction mechanisms [40, 33]. For
example, in worlds where individuals have reputations, we could stipulate that
individuals that choose to use a utilitarian approach gain a positive reputation
[41, 42]. Individuals could then choose only to interact with those who have a
positive reputation, giving an extra incentive for the adoption of Utilitarian A.I.
systems. Moreover, decision-making in networked populations could result in
clusters of Utilitarian A.I. that could be stable as they mostly interact between
themselves [43, 44]. Also, the heterogeneous nature of human interactions may
further increase the chances of reaching a pro-social A.I. [45, 46]. It could also
introduce a natural form of parochialism, as clusters would mostly interact be-
tween themselves. In this work, we assume individuals are fundamentally selfish,
only adopting an A.I. system if it is in their own self interest to do so. However,
it might be argued that individuals might decide to adopt an A.I. system if they
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consider it beneficial for the world, even if not directly beneficial for themselves.
Trying to model this altruistic adoption could be a topic for future work [47].
There are still some weaknesses in just ensuring that non-adopters are not
worse than before. If a part of the population gets better while another part of
the population stays the same, in practice, they become worse in relative terms.
This is already the case with access to education and health: no one is worse off
by having other people going to the doctor or school in comparison to no one
having access to this services, but they are worse in relative terms. However,
if the living conditions of non-adopters increase due to new and more efficient
services being available, then the total fitness might have improved and thus
the fitness of each individual.
One starting assumption in our work was that the individual value alignment
problem was correctly solved. This assumption was modelled in the perfect
observation by A.I. systems of the payoff matrix for both their owners as for
the H they interacted with. However, learning human values is not trivial. A
machine looking at the behaviour of people might assume that the observed
behaviours correspond to what people think is ethical. Unfortunately, examples
abound where people’s actions do not correspond to their preferences or ethics.
Looking at extreme behaviours, we can consider slavery as an example. An A.I.
system might assume that slaves choose to work instead of doing nothing. Of
course, the explanation, in this case, is an unobserved variable: the not working
action would correspond to a much higher penalty than working under duress.
In everyday life, similar examples occur where hidden variables are required
to explain why people are making choices that seem to go against their best
interests. Other simple cases occur when people pay higher prices for single
items where a pack of multiple items would give them a discount, here a non-
observed constraint on the available money to invest would also explain such
behaviours. Creating simulations where the A.I. has to learn the values of their
owners and then act accordingly could provide many insights, and is a strong
avenue for future work. We note that when people have to program an A.I.
system explicitly, they behave in a fairer way than when acting directly [48].
Any multi-agent system model of human societies is always an abstraction of
infinitely more complex behaviours between people. We can think of other types
of interactions for which the same behaviours would have different properties.
One setting of interest would be to combine a matrix game with an ultimatum
type of game. In this setting after observing the payoffs any of the agents could
refuse the deal. The agent better informed might have a higher incentive to
propose a fair deal to avoid rejection. In a more closely related setting with
the ultimatum game where only one agent chooses the action, and the other
can refuse or not again the balance of powers would shift. Another limitation is
that we collapsed all interactions between agents to a one-time choice of a single
action requiring no long-term planning. We could also assume a cost model for
becoming A.I. as a pay per interaction and not a lump sum at adoption time.
This would change the dynamics as more people could become A.I.. This could
prove particularly interesting in the cases where the extra capabilities of the
A.I. system are used to help others such as in the HConscious behaviour.
20
References
[1] E. Yudkowsky, Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in
global risk, Global catastrophic risks 1 (2008) 184.
[2] M. Brundage, Scaling up humanity: The case for conditional optimism
about artificial intelligence, Should we fear artificial intelligence? (2018)
13.
[3] S. Armstrong, N. Bostrom, C. Shulman, Racing to the precipice: a model
of artificial intelligence development, AI & society 31 (2016) 201–206.
[4] A. Hern, Cambridge analytica scandal ’highlights
need for ai regulation’, The Guardian, 2018. URL:
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/16/
cambridge-analytica-scandal-highlights-need-for-ai-regulation.
[5] R. Brooks, The seven deadly sins of ai predictions, Technology
Review, 2017. URL: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609048/
the-seven-deadly-sins-of-ai-predictions/.
[6] A. Etzioni, O. Etzioni, Why regulating ai is a mistake?, Forbes,
2017. URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2017/01/09/
why-regulating-ai-is-a-mistake/.
[7] N. Bostrom, Superintelligence, 2014.
[8] N. Bostrom, Ethical issues in advanced artificial intelligence, Science Fic-
tion and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence (2003) 277–
284.
[9] I. J. Good, Speculations concerning the first ultraintelligent machine, in:
Advances in computers, volume 6, Elsevier, 1966, pp. 31–88.
[10] J. Z. Tan, J. Ding, Ai governance through ”ai” markets (2018).
[11] J. Taylor, E. Yudkowsky, P. LaVictoire, A. Critch, Alignment for advanced
machine learning systems, Machine Intelligence Research Institute (2016).
[12] S. Russell, D. Dewey, M. Tegmark, Research priorities for robust and
beneficial artificial intelligence, Ai Magazine 36 (2015) 105–114.
[13] T. A. Han, L. M. Pereira, T. Lenaerts, Modelling and influencing the ai
bidding war: A research agenda, in: Proceedings of the AAAAI/ACM
Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, (AIES 2019)., 2019.
[14] L. M. Pereira, A. Saptawijaya, Programming machine ethics, volume 26,
Springer, 2016.
[15] D. Shapiro, R. Shachter, User-agent value alignment, in: Proc. of The 18th
Nat. Conf. on Artif. Intell. AAAI, 2002.
21
[16] I. Asimov, I, robot, volume 1, Spectra, 2004.
[17] A. Asilomar, Principles.(2017), in: Principles developed in conjunction
with the 2017 Asilomar conference [Benevolent AI 2017], 2018.
[18] State of california endorses asilomar ai principles, Future of Life
Institute, 2018. URL: https://futureoflife.org/2018/08/31/
state-of-california-endorses-asilomar-ai-principles/.
[19] L. Floridi, J. Cowls, M. Beltrametti, R. Chatila, P. Chazerand, V. Dignum,
C. Luetge, R. Madelin, U. Pagallo, F. Rossi, B. Schafer, P. Valcke,
E. Vayena, An ethical framework for a good ai society: Opportunities,
risks, principles, and recommendations, Minds and Machines (2018).
[20] T. L. Beauchamp, J. F. Childress, Les principes de l’e´thique biome´dicale,
Belles Lettres, 2008.
[21] M. Anderson, S. L. Anderson, Machine ethics: Creating an ethical intelli-
gent agent, AI Magazine 28 (2007) 15.
[22] A. M. Turing, Computing machinery and intelligence, Mind 49 (1950)
433–460.
[23] C. Allen, G. Varner, J. Zinser, Prolegomena to any future artificial moral
agent, Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12
(2000) 251–261.
[24] R. V. Yampolskiy, Artificial intelligence safety engineering: Why machine
ethics is a wrong approach, in: Philosophy and theory of artificial intelli-
gence, Springer, 2013, pp. 389–396.
[25] R. Yampolskiy, J. Fox, Safety engineering for artificial general intelligence,
Topoi 32 (2013) 217–226.
[26] R. V. Yampolskiy, Leakproofing singularity-artificial intelligence confine-
ment problem, Journal of Consciousness Studies JCS (2012).
[27] J. Babcock, J. Krama´r, R. V. Yampolskiy, Guidelines for artificial intelli-
gence containment, arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.08476 (2017).
[28] K. E. Drexler, Engines of creation, Anchor, 1986.
[29] N. Bostrom, Oracle ai, 2008.
[30] D. Chalmers, The singularity: A philosophical analysis, Journal of Con-
sciousness Studies 17 (2010) 7–65.
[31] K. Ashton, How to fly a horse: The secret history of creation, invention,
and discovery, Anchor, 2015.
[32] A. Traulsen, M. A. Nowak, J. M. Pacheco, Stochastic dynamics of invasion
and fixation, Physical Review E 74 (2006) 011909.
22
[33] K. Sigmund, The calculus of selfishness, volume 6, Princeton University
Press, 2010.
[34] M. A. Nowak, Evolutionary dynamics, Harvard University Press, 2006.
[35] J. M. Pacheco, F. C. Santos, M. O. Souza, B. Skyrms, Evolutionary dy-
namics of collective action in n-person stag hunt dilemmas, Proceedings of
the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 276 (2008) 315–321.
[36] F. C. Santos, J. M. Pacheco, Risk of collective failure provides an escape
from the tragedy of the commons, Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences USA 108 (2011) 10421–10425.
[37] H. Bernhard, U. Fischbacher, E. Fehr, Parochial altruism in humans, Na-
ture 442 (2006) 912.
[38] J.-K. Choi, S. Bowles, The coevolution of parochial altruism and war,
Science 318 (2007) 636–640.
[39] J. Garc´ıa, J. C. van den Bergh, Evolution of parochial altruism by multilevel
selection, Evolution and Human Behavior 32 (2011) 277–287.
[40] D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, Human cooperation, Trends in cognitive
sciences 17 (2013) 413–425.
[41] M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund, Evolution of indirect reciprocity, Nature 437
(2005) 1291.
[42] F. P. Santos, F. C. Santos, J. M. Pacheco, Social norm complexity and
past reputations in the evolution of cooperation, Nature 555 (2018) 242.
[43] M. A. Nowak, R. M. May, Evolutionary games and spatial chaos, Nature
359 (1992) 826.
[44] D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, J. H. Fowler, N. A. Christakis, Static network
structure can stabilize human cooperation, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 111 (2014) 17093–17098.
[45] F. C. Santos, J. M. Pacheco, T. Lenaerts, Evolutionary dynamics of so-
cial dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations, Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 103 (2006) 3490–3494.
[46] F. C. Santos, M. D. Santos, J. M. Pacheco, Social diversity promotes the
emergence of cooperation in public goods games, Nature 454 (2008) 213.
[47] A. Paiva, F. P. Santos, F. C. Santos, Engineering pro-sociality with au-
tonomous agents, AAAI 18 (2018) 7994–7999.
[48] C. M. de Melo, S. Marsella, J. Gratch, Social decisions and fairness change
when peoples interests are represented by autonomous agents, Autonomous
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 32 (2018) 163–187.
23
